JA4 t13i140900_cbb2034c60b8_e7c285222651

t13i140900_cbb2034c60b8_e7c285222651

research-scan — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

14

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 4 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13i130900_f57a46bbacb6_e7c285222651
• t13i190900_9dc949149365_e7c285222651
• t13i250900_b78ed14e2fd0_e7c285222651
• t13i300900_3c43a67630b3_e7c285222651

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 14

• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 9

• status_request
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• renegotiation_info
• extended_master_secret
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49161-49171-49162-49172-49170-4865-4866-4867,5-10-11-13-65281-23-18-43-51,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

9

First seen

2026-08-23 02:21 UTC

Last seen

2026-08-25 19:12 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

2

The same client, 2 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 2 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 2 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• ea4a9ae049cfc614efbb3c244abb3fc7
• 1487bd354c20f20dd642bebc7f706e95

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 2×
• - 2×
• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; FreePBX-Scanner/1.0) 1×
• net-research-scan/1.0 (+https://example.org/scan-info; abuse contact) 1×
• Go-http-client/1.1 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.