JA4 t13i190800_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9

t13i190800_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9

Censys — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

19

Extensions offered

8

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 4 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13i030800_55b375c5d22e_97f8aa674fd9
• t13i250800_b78ed14e2fd0_97f8aa674fd9
• t13i260800_3309cf098094_97f8aa674fd9
• t13i270800_fa4239e4ca25_97f8aa674fd9

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 19

• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384

Extensions 8

• status_request
• supported_groups
• ec_point_formats
• signature_algorithms
• renegotiation_info
• signed_certificate_timestamp
• supported_versions
• key_share

Named groups 4

• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1
• secp521r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,52392-52393-49199-49200-49195-49196-49171-49161-49172-49162-156-157-47-53-49170-10-4867-4865-4866,5-10-11-13-65281-18-43-51,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1183

First seen

2026-08-23 02:24 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-10 01:32 UTC

Transport

TCP

JA3 hashes absorbed

12

The same client, 12 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 12 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 12 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 35fa0a83e466acbec1cfbb9016d550ab
• 19e29534fd49dd27d09234e639c4057e
• f72589e607f9b36992b6b437ce399f26
• e873803ab6f54f1316b295ee4fbea1d2
• e5c250b292fce278a62137836169e18f
• f6b1f1a5591b53aa4d6b4a8de8e50ce6
• 89be98bbd4f065fe510fca4893cf8d9b
• cdcd3b10ffd65fac11ce29e16f5eb298
• f6d196664c46af2b855543bd1aa928a3
• cd85bb33041239351d5176c5e28b0e8a
• 5fa4ff59c82a0e63a1ba6e3c0837997b
• a091724136011a85b21838e770d000a4

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; CensysInspect/1.1; +https://about.censys.io/) 363×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/136.0.0.0 Safari/537.36 135×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.9; rv:32.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/32.0 12×
• Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/86.0.4 240.111 Safari/537.36 11×
• Mozilla/5.0 (compatible; ModatScanner/1.2; +https://modat.io/) 11×
• l9explore/1.2.2 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_12_1) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/54.0.2840.98 Safari/537.36 3×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_14_2) AppleWebKit/605.1.15 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/13.1 Safari/605.1.15 1×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Linux; U; Android 8.1.0; es-us; Redmi Note 5 Build/OPM1.171019.011) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Version/4.0 Chrome/71.0.3578.141 Mobile Safari/537.36 XiaoMi 1×
• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_13_6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/75.0.3770.100 Safari/537.36 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.