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⟨ QUANTUM ERROR PORTAL ⟩

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JA4 t13i190800_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9

Scanner — observed in live traffic

Scanner

t13i190800_9dc949149365_97f8aa674fd9

Censys — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

JA4_a t13i190800 handshake shape, human-readable
JA4_b 9dc949149365 truncated hash of the cipher list
JA4_c 97f8aa674fd9 truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
Transport
TCP
TLS version
TLS 1.3
Server name
no server name (IP literal)
Cipher suites offered
19
Extensions offered
8
ALPN
none offered

Same tool, different options

These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version
TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 19

Extensions 8

Named groups 4

Point formats 1

Raw JA3 string
771,52392-52393-49199-49200-49195-49196-49171-49161-49172-49162-156-157-47-53-49170-10-4867-4865-4866,5-10-11-13-65281-18-43-51,29-23-24-25,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections
89
First seen
2026-08-23 02:24 UTC
Last seen
2026-08-26 00:03 UTC
Transport
TCP
JA3 hashes absorbed
4

The same client, 4 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 4 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 4 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.