t13i251000_b78ed14e2fd0_ab7e3b40a677
Firefox — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
t13i251000
handshake shape, human-readable
b78ed14e2fd0
truncated hash of the cipher list
ab7e3b40a677
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- TCP
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- no server name (IP literal)
- Cipher suites offered
- 25
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- none offered
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 25
-
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 -
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 10
-
ec_point_formats -
renegotiation_info -
extended_master_secret -
signed_certificate_timestamp -
status_request -
supported_groups -
signature_algorithms -
signature_algorithms_cert -
supported_versions -
key_share
Named groups 7
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
X25519MLKEM768 -
4589 (0x11ed) -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1 -
secp521r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,49195-49199-49196-49200-52393-52392-49161-49171-49162-49172-156-157-47-53-49170-10-49187-49191-60-49159-49169-5-4865-4866-4867,11-65281-23-18-5-10-13-50-43-51,4588-4587-4589-29-23-24-25,0
Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 19
- First seen
- 2026-08-23 00:22 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-08-26 01:29 UTC
- Transport
- TCP
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 3
The same client, 3 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 3 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 3 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
416eca07dcaad72dec6f76d1277b3eff0698e491fd3a749dfdb6160baf27df9311a384388ad36777e1a2e121495037fe
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
RootEvidence/1.04×Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:139.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/139.01×Mozilla/5.0 (Knoppix; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/141.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (SS; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/133.0.0.0 Safari/537.361×Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:141.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/141.01×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.