JA4 t13i360900_bcee18a5b459_3550537cd59b

t13i360900_bcee18a5b459_3550537cd59b

Probe (no SNI, no ALPN) — inferred from the JA4 handshake shape.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

TCP

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

no server name (IP literal)

Cipher suites offered

36

Extensions offered

9

ALPN

none offered

Same tool, different options

These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• t13i300900_1d37bd780c83_3550537cd59b

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 36

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CCM
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_ARIA_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
• TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA

Extensions 9

• renegotiation_info
• ec_point_formats
• supported_groups
• encrypt_then_mac
• extended_master_secret
• signature_algorithms
• supported_versions
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share

Named groups 11

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• X25519MLKEM768
• 4590 (0x11ee)
• x25519
• secp256r1
• x448
• secp384r1
• secp521r1
• 41 (0x0029)
• ffdhe2048
• ffdhe3072

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4867-4865-49196-49200-49195-49199-52393-52392-159-158-52394-49325-49188-49192-49162-49172-49311-107-57-49324-49187-49191-49161-49171-49310-103-51-157-156-49309-49308-61-60-53-47,65281-11-10-22-23-13-43-45-51,4588-4587-4590-29-23-30-24-25-41-256-257,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

1

First seen

2026-09-06 18:10 UTC

Last seen

2026-09-06 18:10 UTC

Transport

TCP

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10_9_2) 1×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.