q13i0310h3_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36
PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.
What this fingerprint encodes
q13i0310h3
handshake shape, human-readable
55b375c5d22e
truncated hash of the cipher list
505831688e36
truncated hash of extensions + signature algorithms
- Transport
- QUIC
- TLS version
- TLS 1.3
- Server name
- no server name (IP literal)
- Cipher suites offered
- 3
- Extensions offered
- 10
- ALPN
- h3
Same tool, different options
These 1 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.
The hello it was computed from
Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.
- Version
- TLS 1.2
Cipher suites 3
-
TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 -
TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 -
TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256
Extensions 10
-
signature_algorithms -
supported_groups -
quic_transport_parameters -
extended_master_secret -
supported_versions -
key_share -
application_layer_protocol_negotiation -
psk_key_exchange_modes -
status_request -
ec_point_formats
Named groups 7
-
SecP256r1MLKEM768 -
X25519MLKEM768 -
514 (0x0202) -
513 (0x0201) -
x25519 -
secp256r1 -
secp384r1
Point formats 1
-
uncompressed
Raw JA3 string
771,4866-4865-4867,13-10-57-23-43-51-16-45-5-11,4588-4587-514-513-29-23-24,0Seen in live traffic
- Connections
- 5
- First seen
- 2026-10-25 13:21 UTC
- Last seen
- 2026-10-25 14:05 UTC
- Transport
- QUIC
- JA3 hashes absorbed
- 5
The same client, 5 different JA3s
This one JA4 covers 5 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 5 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.
29d83fc1cb369e401efd2a86cc3d1e7d5ff554e68259832776e010540b70c72db4580d64c0fb878d05054994c5a0b551f9b654f4f15f66dca5cfd7a13a28653d149116aa199796474e4f1e6922392f9d
User-Agents seen on this fingerprint
PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.05×
A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.
This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.