JA4 q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36

q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36

PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

h3

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 11

• supported_groups
• key_share
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• extended_master_secret
• supported_versions
• status_request
• ec_point_formats
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• server_name
• quic_transport_parameters
• signature_algorithms

Named groups 4

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867,10-51-16-23-43-5-11-45-0-57-13,4588-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

69

First seen

2026-09-27 17:35 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-15 03:57 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

63

The same client, 63 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 63 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 63 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 78f3b640f3d5e87d87a9525e662fb1b2
• affaa9940aff1b1918b571ecf9724cd0
• fe67f99bf9e7088bf7548d08b83cbec7
• 7b3d36eeee3fa71843eaa6693ad9c37e
• 47d03e60035f4cbc5be5b444baf3d1b6
• 1b19c932c228ac0ca5340d24fdd92ed1
• 1f4c7d5457bcaf7a32133263c1f93d68
• 2c543964177db2c43c5283dc50b8d3fb
• 7b78590a058174b4265c7eff320904c5
• 31e1e8f1a3a045491ba14d97edb84a83
• 8bc79dd00e1045b62370202e601387ac
• 05d5b987ca42801db448f8d0816c28e0
• … and 51 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.0 53×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.