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curl — Server selects a key exchange group the client never offered

The suite could not establish what this client does here. That is a shortcoming of the run rather than anything about the client, and every one of these is on our list to remove.

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⟨ QUANTUM ERROR PORTAL ⟩

Navigate the Error Dimensions

Jump to an anomaly59

Every one of these is a page: what the server emits, the clause it is judged against, and how each client answered. The full list carries the verdict tallies too.

Inconclusive

The run did not exercise this test: the endpoint refused the connection before a handshake existed (the cryptographic handshake failed: error 40: peer is incompatible: NoKxGroupsInCommon). On this tier that is what a client offering no key exchange group this port will negotiate looks like -- a fact about the client, not a gap in the run.

The suite could not establish what this client does here. That is a shortcoming of the run rather than anything about the client, and every one of these is on our list to remove.

What was measured

Client
curl — ngtcp2 + nghttp3, ngtcp2/1.11.0
Test
Server selects a key exchange group the client never offeredt-group-not-offered
Clause
RFC 8446 §4.1.3, §4.2.8, RFC 9001 §4.8 (MUST)
Class
correctness — Rejected something invalid, with the code the RFC names.
Required behaviour
Abort with illegal_parameter. §4.1.3 is explicit that if the selected group was not offered, the client MUST abort — accepting it would let a server steer a client onto a group it deliberately excluded. The port names secp384r1 in its ServerHello against a client that offered only the hybrid, and leaves the payload exactly as generated: the only thing wrong is the name, so a client that aborts can only be aborting over §4.1.3 and not over a share it could not parse. What is judged is the abort, not the alert value. RFC 9001 §4.8 lets a QUIC endpoint replace any alert with a generic one — handshake_failure in place of illegal_parameter — expressly so that a client need not say what it objected to, so the code a client chooses is reported here and not scored. A handshake that ends without any CONNECTION_CLOSE is inconclusive rather than a failure: the group was certainly not accepted, but a close that was never sent cannot be told from one that was lost.
Measured
2026-09-18

Reproduce it

The suite is the judge, so the reproduction is to point the same client at the same test and let the server report what it saw.

SESSION=$(curl -sX POST https://conformance.pqcrypta.com/session | jq -r .id)
# then drive curl at the test URL and read the verdict:
curl -s https://conformance.pqcrypta.com/report/$SESSION.json | jq '.results["t-group-not-offered"]'