xquic — Hybrid key share large enough to split the Initial across packets

Inconclusive

The run did not exercise this test: the handshake failed (aborted by peer: the cryptographic handshake failed: error 40: remote error) for a reason other than the key exchange this port constrains.

The run did not establish what this client does here — either it was never put in the situation, or its answer admits more than one reading. Not a failure, and never counted as one.

What was measured

Client

xquic — Alibaba xquic + BoringSSL, 2060a44

Test

Hybrid key share large enough to split the Initial across packets — t-hybrid-large-hello

Clause

RFC 9000 §8.1, §14.1, RFC 9001 §4.4 (MUST)

Class

resilience — Recovered rather than giving up.

Required behaviour

Complete the handshake with a ClientHello that does not fit one QUIC Initial packet. An ML-KEM-768 key share is 1,216 bytes, which pushes a ClientHello past the 1,200-byte floor RFC 9000 §14.1 sets for an Initial, so the flight must be spread over more than one packet and every one of them padded to the full size. This is the concrete reason post-quantum TLS deployments fail in the field, and it interacts with the §8.1 anti-amplification limit: the server may not send more than three times what it has received, so a client that under-pads its Initials can stall the handshake without either side doing anything invalid.

Measured

2026-09-18

Reproduce it

The suite is the judge, so the reproduction is to point the same client at the same test and let the server report what it saw.

SESSION=$(curl -sX POST https://conformance.pqcrypta.com/session | jq -r .id)
# then drive xquic at the test URL and read the verdict:
curl -s https://conformance.pqcrypta.com/report/$SESSION.json | jq '.results["t-hybrid-large-hello"]'