JA4 q13d0311dq_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36

q13d0311dq_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36

PQCrypta HTTP/3 scanner — inferred from the User-Agent on its requests.

What this fingerprint encodes

Transport

QUIC

TLS version

TLS 1.3

Server name

server name sent

Cipher suites offered

3

Extensions offered

11

ALPN

dq

Same tool, different options

These 2 other fingerprints share this one's JA4_c — the extension and signature-algorithm hash. A client that keeps its extension set constant while varying its cipher list produces exactly this pattern, which is what a scanner iterating cipher suites looks like. A JA3 cannot show you this: its single MD5 collapses ciphers and extensions together, so every variation looks like an unrelated client.

• q13d0311h3_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36
• q13i0310h3_55b375c5d22e_505831688e36

The hello it was computed from

Recovered because the proxy now stores the pre-hash JA3 string alongside the digest. Every number below came out of this client's ClientHello; anything we cannot name in the IANA registry is shown as its raw value rather than guessed at.

Version

TLS 1.2

Cipher suites 3

• TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384
• TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
• TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256

Extensions 11

• quic_transport_parameters
• supported_versions
• server_name
• extended_master_secret
• supported_groups
• application_layer_protocol_negotiation
• signature_algorithms
• status_request
• psk_key_exchange_modes
• key_share
• ec_point_formats

Named groups 7

• SecP256r1MLKEM768
• X25519MLKEM768
• 514 (0x0202)
• 513 (0x0201)
• x25519
• secp256r1
• secp384r1

Point formats 1

• uncompressed

771,4866-4865-4867,57-43-0-23-10-16-13-5-45-51-11,4588-4587-514-513-29-23-24,0

Seen in live traffic

Connections

19

First seen

2026-10-26 04:42 UTC

Last seen

2026-10-29 07:02 UTC

Transport

QUIC

JA3 hashes absorbed

16

The same client, 16 different JA3s

This one JA4 covers 16 distinct JA3 hashes. A JA3 hashes the cipher and extension lists in the order they arrived, so a client that shuffles them — which Chrome and its derivatives do on purpose — produces a new JA3 almost every connection and fragments into what looks like 16 unrelated clients. JA4 sorts those lists before hashing, which is why all of it lands here instead.

• 9ea471a4f0940c00770ef6a001247a2d
• b26a60173184590e10250887904841f7
• 2c73331654d0a43fae2e421ee0a0cabd
• 5359093e27154124746143d6277a4e7c
• 7440c492ce9f2cbdfa4f7970ca99c696
• 6cb2ef253068890b782620eee32a9065
• 6a4ebef7f8b814ef8f23c90fa2c33c31
• 8f248333ef0e7b42d361bead89664a12
• 17643b714116263a3d8db0fe9f5b9353
• cfe6bdd9c4e55a685874794ee13c3de1
• a06417a75f5b19f0ed9533caa4814bf1
• ca80784e04d69506c7a41eed798c2117
• … and 4 more

User-Agents seen on this fingerprint

• PQCrypta-HTTP3-Scanner/1.0 3×

A User-Agent is self-declared and trivially forged, so this names an observation rather than proving an identity. It is still the strongest signal available: the fingerprint comes off the TLS handshake and the User-Agent off the request that followed, and one client build keeping a stable JA4 while changing what it calls itself is a finding in its own right.

This entry is an observation, not a policy decision. It is here because the edge saw it, not because anyone reviewed it, and it blocks nothing on its own. Only the curated tier drives classification and banning.